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Roland Barthes and The Literary Absolute: The Conditions of the 
Necessity to Write Intransitively 
By Jacob Bittner 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I am concerned with the conditions of Roland Barthes’s 
understanding of the act of writing. My concern is how the will-to-write, 
which Barthes addresses in his late lecture course La Préparation du roman 
(1978–80), emerges as ‘a necessity to write intransitively’. I trace how 
Barthes transposes this will-to-write from Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s L’Absolu littéraire (1978) into the context of the life of 
the writer who desires literature. I argue that the historical condition of this 
act of writing is the emergence of literature as an absolute condition of life 
and as a pure a priori form of writing in post-Kantian thought.    
 
 
 
… write, but only if you’re absolutely convinced 
that, if you don’t, you’ll perish (what we call a 
vocation probably refers to this kind of 
survival).1 
––– Roland Barthes 
 
At least two significant events in literary studies took place at the end of the 
year 1978. On the one hand, the commencement of Roland Barthes’s lecture 
course at the Collège de France, La Préparation du roman (The 
Preparation of the Novel) on December 2, 1978, which lasted until the 
beginning of 1980. On the other hand, the publication in September 1978 of 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s L’Absolu littéraire (The 
Literary Absolute) in which the concern is the emergence of the ‘question of 
literature’2 in Early German Romanticism. In his late lecture course, 
Barthes is concerned with a Vouloir-Écrire, a will to write or a desire to 
write, which according to Barthes perhaps signifies an ‘attitude, drive, 
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desire [l’attitude, la pulsion, le désir]’, but overall is ‘insufficiently 
studied’.3 With this term, Barthes refers to Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s The Literary Absolute in which they, with reference to 
Heidegger, understand the journal of Early German Romanticism, the 
Athenaeum (1798–1800), to be a manifestation of ‘the will to system [la 
volonté du système]’.4 Barthes will in the session on December 1, 1979, link 
this will-to-write to The Literary Absolute and on December 8 designate his 
concern as ‘Writing as absolute’.5 In the session of February 23, 1980, 
Barthes will explicitly say that ‘the writer, such as I’ve tried to imagine him’ 
is ‘someone who devotes himself to the Literary Absolute’ (PN, 296). My 
question is what the conditions are for this will-to-write to emerge as what 
Barthes’s understands as a necessity to write and how this necessity is 
linked to the question whether the act of writing is transitive or intransitive. 
How is it possible for Barthes to understand the will-to-write as a necessity 
to write? What are the historical conditions of this necessity to write? In 
order to trace these conditions, I will read Barthes’s lectures in relation with 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s The Literary Absolute and Nancy’s work on 
Kant in The Discourse on the Syncope (Le Discours de la syncope, 1976).   
 
The Will-to-Write in The Literary Absolute 
It is possible to understand The Literary Absolute as a commentary on a 
short digression in Heidegger’s Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of 
Human Freedom (Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen 
Freiheit (1809), 1936/1971): ‘Friedrich Schlegel once said (Athenaeum 
fragment 82) that “a definition that is not witzig is worthless.” This is only a 
romantic transposition of the idealist dialectic’.6 Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe cite this comment by Heidegger in a note to The Literary Absolute 
in which they also add: ‘This affirmation nevertheless raises the question, 
clearly, of what is in fact at stake in this transposition, or of the “play” that 
subsists between idealism and romanticism’.7 Insofar as the ‘advent of 
writing’, according to Derrida, is the advent of ‘the play of signifying 
references that constitute language’,8 the question for Nancy and Lacoue-
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Labarthe is the play of writing that takes place in the post-Kantian space 
between German Idealism and the Athenaeum. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 
thus follow in the wake of Derrida’s deconstruction. Lacoue-Labarthe 
understands his own investigation of the relation of philosophy and 
literature to be in debt to Derrida’s thought.9 In March 1973, Nancy 
presented his work on Hegel at Derrida’s Seminar at the École Normale 
Supérieure, a reading of Hegel which Nancy himself understands to be 
linked to Derrida’s Of Grammatology (De la grammatologie, 1967) in 
which Derrida considers Hegel to be ‘the last philosopher of the book and 
the first thinker of writing.’10 For Derrida, Hegel is the thinker of the book, 
of absolute knowing, in which writing is effaced, but ‘Hegel is also the 
thinker of irreducible difference.’11 Hegel is ‘also’ a thinker of writing, 
which functions as a supplement of the absolute. 
   In The Literary Absolute, the term (German) Idealism refers to Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel, but the main focus is nevertheless on Hegel’s 
dialectical thought.12 Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s concern with Hegel is 
here in line with the traditional focus in recent French thought on German 
Idealism. As Vincent Descombes traces in Modern French Philosophy 
(originally published in French as Le Même et l’autre, 1979), the figure of 
Hegel emerges at the centre of modern French philosophy from the 1930s. 
Besides such readers of Hegel as Jean Hyppolite, Eric Weil and Jean Wahl, 
it is especially Alexandre Kojève’s course on Hegel given at the Ecole 
Pratique des Hautes Etudes from 1933 to 1939 that impacted the turn to 
Hegel in French thought.13  
   According to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, romantic Witz is ‘constituted in 
the greatest proximity to what Hegel will call “Absolute Knowledge”’.14 
But Witz at the same time indicates itself as the gap that separates 
Romanticism and Idealism. In a ‘Remark’ in his Logic, Hegel opposes the 
key dialectical concept of Aufhebung (sublation) to a Ciceronian Witz in 
which the equivocal senses of the Latin tollere is deployed.15 In his entry on 
the concept of Aufhebung in the Dictionary of Untranslatables, Philippe 
Büttgen explains this relation between this Witz and the concept of 
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Aufhebung. Since tollere can mean either to ‘raise’ (to the highest office) or 
to ‘eliminate’, Büttgen writes that ‘the Witz proceeds from the fact that 
Cicero succeeds in making this “second meaning,” which is threatening, 
heard in a passage that is apparently favorable to Octavian (“We must praise 
this young man, adorn him with all the virtues, tollere him”).’16 In 
opposition to the Witz in which the sense is either to ‘raise’ or to 
‘eliminate’, Aufhebung means to ‘raise’, to ‘preserve’ and to ‘eliminate’, all 
at once. 
   In his early work on Hegel, The Speculative Remark (La Remarque 
spéculative, 1973), Nancy presents this difference of concepts in a similar 
manner: ‘tollere covers an antinomic duality (to suppress, to push aside or 
to lift up); aufheben combines a dialectical or speculative duplicity (to 
suppress and to preserve)’.17 The romantic Witz thus introduces 
equivocation into the system where the speculative Aufhebung manifests 
itself as the System presenting itself.18 But does romantic Witz then indicate 
the interruption of the system? Does the either-or of the antinomy of Witz 
interrupt the both-at-once of dialectical Aufhebung?  
   In The Literary Absolute, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe dismiss this 
possibility. They write: ‘The writing of the fragment thus constitutes the 
dialectical Aufhebung of the internal antinomy of Witz. “Fragmentary 
geniality” preserves Witz as work and suppresses it as non-work, sub-work, 
or anti-work’.19 For the Romantics, Witz remains within the horizon of the 
system, of the absolute Work, which means that the antinomy of Witz, the 
opposition of the either-or, always already functions within the dialectic of 
the Subject (the Work), which becomes itself by being other than itself, 
thereby returning to itself. 
   The Literary Absolute is written within the horizon of Heidegger’s history 
of Being. When Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe understand the journal of the 
Early German Romantics, the Athenaeum, to constitute Witz as Absolute, 
this means that they understand the literary absolute as a manifestation of 
‘the will to system [la volonté du système]’.20 This term is a reference to 
Heidegger’s identification of the Being of modern metaphysics as self-
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willing, exigent, the ‘will to be’, which means that being has precedence 
over nothingness: ‘Ever since the developed beginning of modern 
metaphysics, Being is will, that is, exigentia essentiae.’21 According to 
Heidegger, in German Idealism, Being as will becomes ‘the unification of 
the unity of totality striving for itself’.22 Both Hegel’s absolute Subject and 
the literary absolute are specific understandings of Being in which Being is 
the self-grounding of the effective foundation. Being emerges as the will to 
system, which is the English translation of Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
French ‘volonté du Système’,23 which itself is a translation of Heidegger’s 
‘Wille zum System’.24 In Heidegger’s analysis, this Wille zum System is also 
rendered as ‘Systemwille’.25 The German zu- (preposition in Dative) in Wille 
zum System corresponds to the English to indicating that the system is to do; 
however, the German Systemwille furthermore underlines that it is the 
system itself that wills. The French volonté du Système underline both 
senses:26 the system is to (de-) do, but it is the system itself that is to 
produce itself and, in this sense, the preposition de- simply brings the two 
nouns volonté and Système together as in the German Systemwille. The 
literary absolute is thus the system of the will, the Subject’s will, the system 
as Subject. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy therefore choose to give the name 
‘System-subject’ to the literary absolute, which must be the ‘living 
System’.27 The literary absolute is thus a will that wills its own actuality. 
 
The Will-to-Write in Barthes’s Lectures 
In his late lecture course, Barthes’s concern is the will to write, which he 
understands as a desire to write literature. For Barthes, the focus of the 
lecture course is a writerly subject (Barthes himself) who is situated at a 
‘juncture’28 that divides the life which came before and the life that is to 
come. The question for Barthes in this lecture series is the possibility of a 
new future, of a new life, which can only be a writerly life insofar as 
Barthes is someone who writes: ‘Now, for someone who writes, […] there 
can be no other Vita Nova (or so it seems to me) than the discovery of a new 
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writing practice.’29 For Barthes, the will-to-write is ‘explicit’30 in Rilke’s 
Letters to a Young Poet insofar as these letters concern a necessity to write:  
 
The ‘essential’ form of the Advice offered to a Writer 
ultimately concerns not the practice of writing but the very 
Will to Write: Writing as the Telos of a life = in answer to the 
question ‘Should I write? Continue to Write?’ they all say 
(Flaubert, Kafka, Rilke): it’s not a matter of a gift, of talent, but 
of survival: write, but only if you’re absolutely convinced that, 
if you don’t, you’ll perish (what we call a vocation probably 
refers to this kind of survival).31  
 
Rilke’s letters written at the beginning of the twentieth century are 
addressed to the young poet (Franz Xaver Kappus) who would be situated in 
a position of suspension between a ‘must’ and a ‘cannot’. The writer is not 
able not to write but nevertheless not able to write. The aim of Rilke’s 
letters is precisely to address the question of how to manage this position 
between a necessity to write and an impossibility of writing. It is from this 
perspective that one should understand the notion of patience (Geduld) that 
is a recurrent theme in these letters. Rilke proposes to the young writer in a 
letter from Paris (February 17, 1903): ‘Nobody can advise you and help 
you, nobody. There is only one way. Go into yourself. […] This above all: 
ask yourself in your night’s quietest hour: must I write?’32 Barthes’s course 
is an ‘intellectual narrative [récit intellectuel]’ about ‘a man who’s 
deliberating the best way to realize that desire [of writing], or that will 
[volonté], or indeed that vocation’.33 For Barthes, ‘writing leads [life]: 
poetically, transcendentally’.34 Writing is the transcendental condition of 
this life devoted to writing literature. 
   It is here possible to see the connection between Barthes’s understanding 
of the Will-to-Write as a necessity to write and his assertion that the writer 
is someone who is devoted to the literary absolute. When literature emerges 
as absolute for a subject as the condition of this very subject’s life, this 
subject is a writer who cannot not-write literature. Moreover, when 
literature is the condition that constitutes the subject’s very desire, it is not 
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possible for this subject to not-desire writing. Within the horizon of the 
literary absolute as a ‘transcendental’ condition, the desire of writing is the 
very condition of this writerly life. The consequence is that it is not possible 
to distinguish between the writer and literature since the writer’s very life 
depends on (the actualization of) the literary work. Barthes can therefore 
claim that the will-to-write delimits literary writing insofar as literature is 
‘an order of knowledge where the product is indistinguishable from the 
production, the practice from the drive’.35 In Barthes’s understanding of 
literary practice, the written work coincides with the act of writing as the 
will-to-write. Barthes says: ‘To say that you want to write – there, in fact, 
you have the very material of writing’.36 For Barthes, literature is thus 
situated at the indistinction between producer and production, between life 
and writing, between subject and work.  
   Barthes focus is thus ‘existential, not aesthetic’37 since it concerns the 
‘Desire to be’38 which for the writer Barthes is a ‘desire for language [désir 
du langage]’.39 For Barthes, the question is not to suspend writing, but to 
interrupt the incessant will-to-write so as to make possible a new life. To 
think the verb to write anew concerns the possibility of inventing a new 
practice of writing in which there is no necessity to write, no desire of 
writing, which makes the interruption of writing impossible. Since literature 
is absolute for this writer, Barthes’s lecture course concerns the interruption 
of the desire for literature that coincides with the interruption of literature as 
absolute. We should pay attention to the implicit transposition of the will-to-
write that takes place here: Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s study concerns 
the concept of the literary absolute as the ‘living System’40 whereas 
Barthes’s lectures concern the system that is alive as the writer who must 
write literature. For Barthes, the literary absolute is not simply a concept of 
the absolute, but embedded in the writer who must write. This transposition 
of the literary absolute as a concept into that which constitutes an actual 
living being is the condition of Barthes’s investigation into the will-to-write. 
   Barthes understands himself as someone who is devoted to the literary 
absolute: literature has emerged as the absolute condition of the subject’s 
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life. At the beginning of the second session (December 9, 1978), Barthes 
presents the horizon for his practice of writing as the question whether to 
write is an intransitive or transitive verb: ‘For a long time I thought that 
there was a Will-to-Write [Vouloir-Écrire] in itself: To Write, intransitive 
verb – now I’m less sure. Perhaps to will to write = to will to write 
something → To Will-to-Write + Object.’41 But the question is then what 
the conditions are for the necessity to write to emerge as the question of an 
intransitive act of writing. What is the link between the necessity to write 
and the verb to write understood as intransitive? How does literature emerge 
as intransitivity? 
 
The Question of Intransitive Writing 
In 1978, the writerly subject (Barthes) is ‘less sure’ now than he was before 
whether there is an act of writing in which to write is an intransitive verb. 
With an allusion to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s study, Barthes 
understands in his late lectures the question of intransitive writing to have 
emerged at the time of the Early German Romantics.42 Here Barthes 
implicitly revises a claim from his early work, Writing Degree Zero (Le 
Degré zero de l’ecriture, 1953), in which he conceptualized the 1850s as the 
modern moment when literature emerges as an object of knowledge.43 The 
Year of Revolution (1848) is the date for an a priori event at which the 
classical age of Belles Lettres disappears and (modern) literature emerges. 
This disappearance signifies the fragmentation of ‘the ideological unity of 
the bourgeoisie [which] gave rise to a single mode of writing’ since ‘literary 
form could not be divided because consciousness was not’.44 The 
disappearance thus manifests the historicity of the (Hegelian) concept of a 
true classical consciousness in which form and content coincide and an 
atemporal universal (bourgeois) consciousness functions as the transparent 
condition of society. Barthes rejects this consciousness as ideology, but he 
confirms the (Hegelian) thesis that literature is ‘tragic’ because the writer’s 
‘consciousness no longer accounts for the whole of his condition.’45 Since 
there is no universal norm in (modern) literature, there is a multiplication in 
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the modes of writing, which are however all attempts to find a solution to 
their (alienated) condition as ‘writers without [universal] Literature.’46 
Barthes diagnosis is that the very condition of possibility of literature 
produces its inability to overcome itself:  
 
literary writing carries at the same time the alienation of 
History and the dream of History; as a Necessity, it testifies to 
the division of languages which is inseparable from the 
division of classes; as Freedom, it is the consciousness of this 
division and the very effort which seeks to surmount it.47  
 
Literature embodies a division of a plurality of modes of writing which all 
aim to overcome their division; however, since literature is also the 
consciousness of the historicity of the ideological character of the universal 
(bourgeoisie), literature occupies a position of alienation in which its only 
‘utopian’ possibility is its own disappearance: ‘For Literature is like 
phosphorous: it shines with its maximum brilliance at the moment when it 
attempts to die.’48 The brilliance of literature is its appearance as the 
interruption of the dialectical production of meaning. For Barthes of 1953, 
the modern literary object indicates only the very disappearance of the 
literary object since ‘it is the existence of Literature itself which is called 
into question’.49 Barthes writes: ‘Modernism begins with the search for a 
Literature which is no longer possible.’50  
   Thirteen years later, in the paper ‘To Write: Intransitive Verb?’ (‘Écrire, 
verbe intransitif?’), delivered at the seminal conference at Johns Hopkins 
University in 1966, Barthes identifies the apparent transformation of the 
verb to write from its transitive to its intransitive sense as ‘the sign of an 
important change in mentality.’51 In modernity, the verb to write would not 
be a transitive verb (to write something) but an intransitive verb (to write, 
tout court). But Barthes nevertheless here questions the idea that to write is 
in fact an intransitive verb: “No writer, whatever age he belongs to, can fail 
to realize that he always writes something”.52 The modern writer who writes 
intransitively still appears to be linked to an “object” of writing.  
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The Emergence of Intransitive Writing  
My concern here is not to resolve the question whether intransitive writing 
in fact exists. Rather, my aim is to trace the conditions of this thought of 
intransitive writing. What are the conditions for the emergence of what we 
can name the subject who must write intransitivity? In order to trace this 
emergence, I will argue that it is necessary to analyze what happens when 
the literary absolute is transposed from being a concept of the living system 
into a system that is alive. We have already seen how the literary absolute 
emerges as the condition of the subject who must write literature. But the 
question is then also how literature emerges as an intransitive act of writing. 
I will argue that the transposition of the literary absolute into an actual 
subject who must write literature also is the condition for the emergence of 
literature as an intransitive act of writing. With reference to Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s work, I have aimed to show how the romantic Witz 
introduces equivocation into thinking of the absolute system, but 
nevertheless remains within the thinking of the absolute Will. I will now 
return to Nancy’s early work on Kant in order to trace what the conditions 
are for the literary absolute to emerge in Barthes’s lectures as a subject who 
must write intransitively.  
   In The Discourse on the Syncope, Nancy claims that the ‘moment of 
Kant’53 is ‘the moment in which philosophy explicitly designates its own 
exposition as literature’.54 My initial concern is to show how this Kantian 
moment manifests ‘literature’ as form of a priori writing, which prepares 
the later understanding of literature as absolute in the journal of the 
Romantics, the Athenaeum. This Kantian moment will also be a condition 
for the emergence of literature as intransitive writing, since it will constitute 
literature as an a priori writing in which the possibility of the objectivity of 
the literary ‘object’ is always in question.  
   The notion that the Kantian moment exposes philosophical presentation as 
‘literature’ does not mean that Kant invents literature; rather, it means that 
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literature arises as a solution to a Kantian problem of how to present 
philosophy. Kant never recognises ‘literature’ as a solution as such; 
however, Nancy traces how the problem of the exposition of philosophy 
becomes a fundamental problem for Kant. This is the problem of how 
thinking can exhibit itself, of philosophical Darstellung, of philosophical 
presentation.55 It is because of this problem that the Kantian moment is the 
time when it becomes ‘possible and necessary to expressly distinguish 
between philosophy and literature’.56  
   Nancy’s analysis presupposes Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 1929), which is a 
reworking of a lecture course first delivered at the University of Marburg in 
1927–28.57 Heidegger understands Kant’s first Critique as an attempt to find 
a ‘secure course of a science’,58 which is to prevent metaphysics from both 
scepticism and from dogmatically overstepping the limits of the sensible in 
order to grasp the absolute (the supersensible). On the one hand, for Kant 
the absolute is that which ‘reason [Vernunft] necessarily and with every 
right demands [verlangt] in things in themselves for everything that is 
conditioned, thereby demanding the series of conditions as something 
completed [vollendet].’59 But, on the other hand, Kant excludes the absolute 
as a possible object of knowledge: ‘the unconditioned [das Unbedingte] 
must not be present [angetroffen] in things [Dingen] insofar as we are 
acquainted with them (insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things 
insofar as we are not acquainted with them, as things in themselves’.60 For 
Kant, metaphysics has failed in its attempt to establish itself as a science 
since it lacks a ‘procedure’.61 The Critique is therefore a ‘treatise’ on 
‘method’,62 which is not itself the system of metaphysics, but which is to 
make the system possible. According to Heidegger, method is here not 
simply ‘the technique for proceeding’, but ‘the working out of a complete 
determination of the “whole contour” and the “whole internal, articular 
structure” of ontology’.63 Heidegger thus understands Kant’s Critique as an 
attempt to lay the ground for metaphysics: ‘the fundamental knowledge of 
beings as such and as a whole’.64  
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   For Kant, human knowledge is thus not intuitus originarius, an infinite 
divine knowledge or an absolute intuition, which originally produces 
beings; rather, it is an intuitus derivativus, a derived intuition, which cannot 
make the being come-into-being, but must be receptive for the already given 
being.65 For Heidegger, Kant’s aim is to secure an ontological 
(transcendental) knowledge. In Heidegger’s terms, the Critique aims to 
constitute ‘the Being of the being’,66 which for Kant concerns a knowledge 
of objects a priori, a cognition, ‘which is to establish something about 
objects before they are given to us.’67 Kant’s insight is to focus on things 
insofar as they appear to us since metaphysics might be secured if we 
distinguish between ‘objects as appearances’ that conform to the human 
way of representing and ‘things in themselves’ as the things insofar as they 
are not given to us.68  
   For Heidegger, the question at the core of the Kantian Critique is the 
question of human finitude since human pure reason is the foundation for 
establishing metaphysics.69 He presents the Kantian problematic of 
representing in terms of the question of transcendence. The finite being (the 
human), in its ecstatic turning ‘itself toward’ and ‘standing-out-from’, lets 
objects horizontally ‘stand-against’ itself and thereby ‘holds before itself – a 
horizon’70 that first makes possible any experience of objects (objectivity). 
In Heidegger’s admittedly ‘violent’ analysis, which focuses on the unsaid of 
Kant’s Critique, the main question in the first Critique is the question of 
how to understand the problem of schematism, which Kant describes as ‘a 
hidden art in the depths of the human soul’.71 For Kant, schematism 
concerns the synthesis or unification of sensible intuition and pure concepts 
(categories). The schema is ‘the sensible concept of an object’,72 the 
synthesis of intuition and pure concepts, which as a unity makes possible 
the experience of objects. The ‘schema’ is ‘the pure synthesis’, which is a 
‘transcendental product of the imagination’.73 According to Heidegger, it is 
thus the transcendental imagination that for Kant ‘forms the look of the 
horizon of objectivity as such in advance, before the experience of the being 
[Seienden]’.74  
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   The transcendental imagination is the ‘root’75 of the two stems of human 
knowledge, sensibility and understanding. This is a source that Kant writes 
‘perhaps’ exists, but in any case is ‘unknown’ to us.76 In Heidegger’s 
analysis, the transcendental imagination becomes the finite ‘creative’ 
faculty, which is not ontically creative since it is not an absolute intuition, 
but which forms the pure image (Bild) of time by which objectivity becomes 
possible.77 Understanding (conceptual representing) is here itself relative to 
intuition (the pure forms of time and space) since, as Kant writes, the 
intuition relates ‘immediately’ to the object whereas the understanding ‘is 
mediate’.78 For Kant, knowing is thus ‘intuiting thinking’ insofar as the 
faculty for judging is the faculty for thinking: ‘Judgment is therefore the 
mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation [concept] of a 
representation of it [intuition].’79 Moreover, according to Heidegger, there is 
a division in intuition itself insofar as ‘time has a preeminence over 
space’.80 As ‘the form of inner sense’,81 time manifests itself as successive 
‘states of our mind’82 without spatial relations. Kant understands time as 
‘the intuition of our self’,83 which is thus nothing but ‘pure self-affection’.84 
In this understanding of time as ‘pure self-affection’, Heidegger finds the 
traces of a more original time that he understands (against Kant) to mean 
that the subjectivity of the subject itself consists in a time, which forms the 
possibility of transcendence. In the last instance, transcendental 
imagination, as the root of the two sources of knowledge (intuition and 
understanding), is thus itself ‘rooted in original time’85 since the pure, finite 
subject is in itself temporalisation. On the one hand, Heidegger can 
therefore say that, in the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics, ‘the 
grounding of the inner possibility of ontology is brought about as an 
unveiling of transcendence, i.e. [an unveiling] of the subjectivity of the 
human subject’.86 The fundamental question of the Critique is thus the 
question of human finitude. But, on the other hand, Kant never firmly 
established the transcendental imagination at the core of the subject’s 
transcendental synthesis. Rather, according to Heidegger, in the second 
version of the first Critique, ‘Kant falls back from the ground which he 
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himself had laid’87 because this ground (finitude) undermines the very 
concept of pure reason (subjectivity) that forms the point of departure for 
the Critique. From Heidegger’s perspective, in order to retain the Subject as 
a foundation, Kant neglects to pose the question of the relation between 
human finitude and Being. In Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s words from 
The Literary Absolute, this means that, ‘an abyss opens up where a bridge 
should have been built’.88  
   According to The Literary Absolute, it is this abyss, ‘this problematic of 
the subject unpresentable to itself’, which Romanticism ‘will receive, not as 
a bequest but as its “own” most difficult and perhaps insoluble question’.89 
With Heidegger’s analysis in mind, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe will state, 
regarding the section of the Critique on the transcendental aesthetic (‘a 
science of all principles of a priori sensibility’):90 ‘What does the 
transcendental Aesthetic represent? Not the traditional division of the 
sensible and the intelligible but rather the division between two forms (a 
priori) within the ‘sensible’ or intuitive itself. The first and most 
fundamental result is that there is no intuitus originarius’.91 There is no 
absolute intuition, no absolute Subject, but only a division between the two 
pure forms of intuition, time and space.  
   In The Discourse on the Syncope, Nancy addresses how this Kantian 
problem of how to situate the foundation of metaphysics in a common root 
(the transcendental imagination) corresponds to the problem of how to 
present philosophy. This problem of presentation (Darstellung) will give 
rise to the question of literature, which is also to say that this question (of 
literature) is first ‘posed within philosophy itself.’92 Nancy addresses the 
problem of Darstellung in relation to Kant’s distinction from ‘The 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method’ in the first Critique between 
mathematical cognition and philosophical cognition.93 According to Kant, 
mathematics travels ‘the secure path of a science’94 since it is supposed to 
establish its objects purely a priori. Nancy can therefore say that, for Kant, 
the ‘only invulnerable presentation is mathematical presentation’ since it is 
‘the only adequate grammar [régime] of a joint presentation of the concept 
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and the intuition that responds to it.’95 Mathematics is the only proper locus 
in which a presentation of the unity of understanding and sensibility in the 
transcendental imagination could be carried out. But, as Nancy points out, 
philosophy is restrained by a linguistic imperative, which means that 
philosophy ‘must discourse’.96 Philosophical exposition thus ‘reveals a 
particular fragility’,97 the fragility of its discursive status, which for Kant 
involves the question of the foundation (transcendental imagination) of 
philosophy itself since language can never be a totally adequate form of 
presentation. Nancy writes that philosophy ‘must’ for this reason ‘desire 
elegance’98 since the exposition of philosophy always already exposes this 
science to its own insufficiency. The pure system should be presented a 
priori, but ‘the grapheme is always inadequate, uncertain, buried, 
misshapen, or damaged.’99  
   The problem of Darstellung is thus the problem of the lack of the 
foundation of the system since it means that the system is always already 
displaced. The system needs the substitution of elegance since it is exposed 
to its discursive presentation: ‘Elegance is the term substituted for the 
presentation of the mathematical opus, and the desire for it is the desire to 
write a book. “Literature” will be the name of the object of desire of the lost 
opus.’100 At the very core of Kant’s Critique, the question of writing 
emerges as the problem of philosophical exposition. Philosophy will never 
be able to accomplish a ‘pure writing’, an intransitive writing, a writing 
without anything written, a pure presentation. Literature will be the name of 
the loss of the desired adequate philosophical presentation: ‘to write in not 
writing’.101 Literature will be the locus of the pure writing of a ‘poet-
philosopher’, an impossible hybrid figure that Nancy proposes: ‘the 
mathematician who would write (in prose).’102 But literature will thus 
precisely be the impossible fiction of a pure writing: ‘literature will only 
come to be determined as fiction from the point of view of the philosophy 
that determines the ideal beyond the limits of possible experience.’103 The 
modern category of literature arises within the horizon of the philosophy of 
finitude (Kant’s Critique), but literature will at the same time be that which 
 16 
always already transgresses possible experience. From the Kantian 
perspective, literature is not a philosophical possibility since it is the fiction 
of an infinite or absolute intuition. The Kantian moment manifests 
‘literature’ as the fictional realisation of a pure philosophical writing, a form 
of a priori writing, which would be the writing of pure ‘reason’ itself, 
independent of all empirical limiting conditions. 
   Literature emerges as a solution to the problem of how to present 
philosophy: it is the fiction of a pure a priori writing, of an absolute 
intransitive writing. In his Dialogue on Poetry (Das Gespräch über die 
Poesie, 1800) published in the journal Athenaeum (1798–1800), Friedrich 
Schlegel lets the figure Ludovico pose the question of literature: ‘Do you 
perhaps consider it impossible to construct future poems a priori? [Halten 
Sie es etwa für unmöglich, zukünftige Gedichte a priori zu 
konstruieren?].’104 The critical question of literature is: how is poetry a 
priori possible?105 Literature arises as the question of how to produce an 
absolute, intransitive work. The Athenaeum represents the core of the 
Kantian moment, insofar as this journal inaugurates literature as absolute.  
 
The Interruption of Writing 
My aim has been to show how the literary absolute emerges as the question 
of an intransitive act of writing in order to expose the conditions of 
Barthes’s lectures in which the figure of the writer arises as what I here call 
the subject who must write intransitively. On the one hand, it is visible how 
the literary absolute constitutes a writer who must write since his very being 
is conditioned by literature. On the other hand, we can see how the literary 
absolute produces itself as an intransitive act of pure a priori writing. The 
subject who is constituted by the literary absolute is the writer who must 
write intransitively. This link between the necessity to write and the 
intransitive work indicates the reason for Barthes’s inability to confirm 
intransitive writing: the intransitive work, which is supposed to ‘be’ without 
work, is in fact intrinsically linked to the thinking of the absolute work as 
the writer’s condition. Both the necessity to write and the thinking of the 
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intransitive work emerge when Barthes transposes the concept of the literary 
absolute into being the condition of the writer.   
   However, in the lectures, Barthes is not only concerned with this current 
position of the writer as someone who must write literature. Rather, he 
proposes that the literary work of the future ‘should cease to be, or be only 
discretely, a discourse of the work about the work’.106 The work of the 
future should not be absolutely marked by intransitivity so as to produce the 
subject who says: ‘I can’t write a work, there’s no longer any work to be 
written, the only thing left for me to write is that there’s nothing to write.’107 
Barthes fantasised moment of temporalisation is ‘a time when you’ll stop 
writing, when you’ll finally take a break, less from writing than from the 
perpetual reactivation of the desire’.108 This is a fantasy in which there is an 
interruption of the desire of writing. Here the desire as desire is put into 
question, which opens up the possibility of interrupting the desire of the 
subject who must desire to write. But this interruption of desire should not 
necessarily be a break from writing; rather, the question is whether it is 
possible to enact a practice of writing in which the will-to-write, the desire 
of writing, is suspended. Since for Barthes the necessity to write is 
intrinsically linked to the impossibility of finishing an actual work, it is an 
illusion that there could ever be an absolute work: ‘You labor on the work 
like a maniac, in order to finish it – but as soon as it’s finished, you start 
another one, under the same illusory conditions’.109 For Barthes, the writer 
is situated in the position of the will-to-write between the desire for a work 
and the impossibility of any intransitive work. In order to resists this 
suspended position, Barthes is thus constantly approaching the limit of this 
will-to-write. With reference to Heidegger, Barthes says:  
 
You remember the citation from Heidegger: in Nature, each 
thing remains within the allotted sphere of the Possible; only 
‘will’ takes us outside of the Possible. I said that Writing, as 
Will, was an Impossible (which I was opposing to Idleness, as 
Nature). – We can now say: even within the will to write, that 
is, within its Impossible, the task of Talent is to remain within 
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its Possible: to precisely delineate the Nature within this Non-
Nature that is Writing.110 
 
Since the will-to-write is a necessity to write the impossible intransitive 
work, the task of the writer must be to position himself at the site in which 
writing becomes possible as a form of non-writing and inoperativity 
(‘idleness’). The fact that this subject must write does therefore not mean 
that he can write; rather, this subject is precisely situated in the suspension 
between a necessity to write (without object) and the impossibility of 
writing (an object). In ‘The Obverse of Signs’, with reference to the critic 
Barthes as a ‘writer postponed’, Gérard Genette proposed literature to be the 
incessant postponement of the work:  
 
literature is for the semiologist (the critic) a permanent 
temptation, an endless vocation postponed until later, 
experienced only this dilatory mode […] but the postponement 
is only apparent, for this intention to write, this ‘Moses-like 
gaze’ on the work to come is already Literature.111  
 
From this perspective, Barthes emerges precisely in the position of the critic 
who coincides with the writer who cannot not-write intransitively. Insofar as 
the will-to-write is Rilke’s necessity to write in which the verb to write 
appears to be intransitive, the question for Barthes becomes how to interrupt 
this necessity to write so as to delimit a new inoperative practice of writing. 
But this question of how to interrupt the desire of writing thus goes beyond 
Barthes’s concern for his own position as a writer since it concerns the very 
question of literature. Unless literary thought aims to stay within a thinking 
of the absolute, the question on the level of the act of writing is how it is 
possible to interrupt the necessity to write. Here my aim has been to trace 
the conditions for this necessity to write in Barthes’s lectures.    
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